Can Russia Be Defeated? The Question the West Can No Longer Avoid

It is now More than four and a half years after Russia launched its special military operation in Ukraine. In recent times, Europe confronts a question far more profound, uncomfortable, and consequential than whether Ukraine deserves Western support. It is whether the political objective attached to that support is achievable. This  is not merely a question of military strategy. it is a fundamental test of geo-political judgement, historical understanding, and the wisdom of Western leadership. Since the outbreak of the conflict, the dominant Western narrative has portrayed Russia as the sole architect of the conflict. Its actions as a flagrant violation of Ukrainian sovereignty. The Military operation is perceived as an assault not only on an independent nation but on the democratic values and rules-based international order that the West claims to defend. Yet a serious examination of this tragedy demands that we look beyond the convenient simplicity of a narrative that begins history on 24 February 2022. Geo-political conflicts of such magnitude do not emerge in a historical vacuum. They are often the culmination of years of accumulated grievances, strategic miscalculations, competing security interests, and failures of diplomacy.

Repeated warnings from Russia about NATO's eastward expansion have fallen on deaf ears. Many times, Russia conveyed to EU leaders that its strategic concerns be taken seriously. But they were  dismissed rather than meaningfully addressed. Russia has legitimate concerns, and understanding the root causes of a conflict is different from justifying them. But no intellectually credible analysis can ignore the role of Western policies in creating the conditions for confrontation. Post-Cold War Western policy toward Russia has shown a disturbing lack of will to engage Russia as an equal partner while changing Europe's strategic architecture. Russia is perceived as a diminished power expected to accommodate a strategic architecture designed largely without its consent. This asymmetry raises several concerns. Is there a re-emergence of the older Imperial thinking in Russia? Was there a Russian desire for a strategic framework that integrates them as equal partners? Western governments need to be clear on their end goals. Is defending Ukrainian sovereignty their end goal? Would it be in the interest of Ukraine, Russia and Europe to integrate Russia in the European security framework? Ukrainian conflict is taking a heavy toll on Europe, and other regions of the world. Therefore, an answer is long overdue.

Europe is now confronting the consequences of decades of unresolved security tensions, competing geopolitical ambitions, and missed diplomatic opportunities. Whether these developments were inevitable remains debatable. What is increasingly difficult to dispute is that the European security architecture established after the Cold War has failed to prevent another devastating conflict on the continent. Europe is facing a more important question than whether Ukraine deserves support from the West. Is the goal of providing this support achievable, and what happens if it is not? This framing addresses the war, but it ignores the longer, more complicated history between Russia and the West. While the attack on Ukraine is undoubtedly unjustified, it begs the questions: Where have diplomatic efforts failed? Where have strategies been miscalculated? The result of these failures means Ukraine has become the scene of a devastating war, and a bigger conflict between Russia and the West. The deeper question is whether Western strategy seeks to secure Ukraine's sovereignty and protect European Democracy or to destroy Russia strategically. At stake, therefore, is not simply the outcome of a war, but whether European political elite and unwise leaders possess the historical imagination, strategic realism, and political courage to recognise a fundamental truth: a durable peace cannot be built upon the permanent insecurity of one of the continent's principal powers. Just as the security of a great power cannot legitimately be purchased through the destruction of its neighbour's sovereignty.

Economist Jeffrey Sachs is known for being somewhat critical of US foreign policy. However, in May 2022, he expressed even more direct criticism. Specifically, he argued that discussion about defeating Russia was "reckless." "Reckless" because talk of military victory ignores the possibility of the objectives being achieved through diplomacy. The key point of his arguments is that the conflict in Ukraine is part of a larger geo-political competition between the United States and Russia. After the collapse of Soviet Union while Russia has been militarily weakened, it is still a great power, largely due to its size and natural resources. Then there was the even clearer statement from President of Kazakhstan Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in September 2024. Tokayev said, "It is a fact that Russia cannot be defeated militarily." He pointed out that further confrontation would surely endanger international peace and security and that the only reasonable way out of this situation was to look for a political settlement.

As we have seen, senior US officials also stated that Russian President Vladimir Putin cannot be left with the ability to invade other countries, as it would give rise to further aggression, threatening America's allies and partners. Soon after the meeting with Mr Zelenskyy, then-Secretary of Defence Lloyd Austin stated that the goal of the US was for Russia to become so weakened that it could not do the same thing in Ukraine that it had done previously. At the time, Mr Austin was in Kyiv, and praised Ukraine for being democratic and committed to the rule of law. He also condemned Mr Putin's invasion for undermining those same principles and for challenging Ukraine's right to 'self-determination'. Secretary Austin said that, for the US, the primary objective was for Ukraine to remain democratic and sovereign, as well as for it to be able to defend its own territory. Documents show the US sought to strategically defeat Russia. This was in addition to Washington seeking to weaken Moscow's ability to act militarily and aggressively in the future. Some critics of the US's foreign policy and Russian officials claim that Western governments, especially the US, used Ukraine as a tool to destroy Russia

Wars have a way of evolving their own purposes. A conflict initiated to achieve a single objective may ultimately morph into a multi-pronged engagement encompassing several military, geo-political and economic objectives. Alliances may deepen while sanctions and defence industries also expand. Political reputations become intertwined with outcomes on the battlefield. Compromise becomes more difficult politically because leaderships believe that accepting terms will convey defeat. This raises the question, "What does victory actually mean?" When we examine this question in the context of the current state of the world, it becomes evident that the West cannot win this conflict. Ukraine has already lost 25% of its territory. Just because Russia may have certain advantages in this conflict does not mean it is invincible. Therefore, the discourse should not be focused on two sides: those who "support Ukraine" and those who "support Russia". A legitimate question is: what kind of political solution can protect Ukraine's independence?

Military operations must eventually serve a political end. When the political objective becomes undefined, constantly expanding or militarily unreachable, battlefield success can become an end in itself. This is why the debate about Ukraine now needs greater intellectual precision rather than louder slogans. One can support the sovereignty of Ukraine and condemn the Russian invasion. And one can acknowledge that Western governments explicitly sought to weaken Russia's ability to undertake further aggression. These distinctions are not semantic. They determine what kind of peace may eventually be possible. The most important question facing Europe may therefore be neither "How can Russia win?" nor "How can Russia be defeated?" It may be this: What outcome can leave Ukraine genuinely sovereign and secure and establish a European security order durable enough that another generation does not inherit the same war? After years of bloodshed, that question deserves to occupy as much diplomatic energy as the conduct of the war itself.